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Abstract 
Within the framework of a partnership agreement, EADS ASTRIUM has worked since June 2006 for the 
CNES formation flying experiment on the PRISMA mission. EADS ASTRIUM is responsible for the 
anti-collision function. This responsibility covers the design and the development of the function as a 
Matlab/Simulink® library, as well as its functional validation and performance assessment. PRISMA is a 
technology in-orbit testbed mission from the Swedish National Space Board, mainly devoted to 
formation flying demonstration. PRISMA is made of two micro-satellites that will be launched in 2009 
on a quasi-circular SSO at about 700 km of altitude. The CNES FFIORD experiment embedded on 
PRISMA aims at flight validating an FFRF sensor designed for formation control, and assessing its 
performances, in preparation to future formation flying missions such as Simbol X; FFIORD aims as 
well at validating various typical autonomous rendezvous and formation guidance and control 
algorithms. This paper presents the principles of the collision avoidance function developed by EADS 
ASTRIUM for FFIORD; three kinds of manoeuvres were implemented and are presented in this paper 
with their performances.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
As part of a partnership, EADS ASTRIUM has worked since June 2006 for the CNES formation flying experiment on 
the PRISMA mission.  
EADS ASTRIUM is responsible for the anti-collision function. This responsibility covered the design and the 
development of the Matlab/Simulink® function in 2006. In 2007 the partnership was extended to cover functional 
validation and performances assessment. 
2. ABBREVIATIONS 
CDTI Centro para el Desarrollo Tecnológico Industrial 
CNES Centre National d’Études Spatiales 
DLR Deutsche Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt 
DTU Danmarks Tekniske Universitet 
FF Formation Flying 
FFIORD Formation Flying In-Orbit Ranging Demonstration 
FFRF Formation Flying Radio-Frequency (sensor) 
GPS Global Positioning System 
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MIB Minimum Impulse Bit 
RF Radio-Frequency 
Rx Receiver 
RGPS Relative GPS 
SSC Swedish Space Corporation   
SSO Sun-Synchronous Orbit 
TC Telecommand 
TM Telemetry 
Tx Transmitter 
VBS Visual Based Sensor 
3. PRISMA MISSION 
PRISMA (refer to [1] for further details) is a technology in-orbit testbed mission from the Swedish National Space 
Board, mainly devoted to formation flying and rendezvous demonstration, and also to the implementation of new 
sensors and actuators. The Swedish Space Corporation is the prime contractor, responsible for its design, integration 
and operations, and will as well lead some formation flying experiments, such as autonomous guidance, rendezvous and 
proximity operations.  
PRISMA is made of two spacecraft that will be launched in 2009 on a quasi-circular SSO at about 700 km of altitude: 
one is called the TARGET spacecraft (40 kg), and the other is the MAIN spacecraft (140 kg). Both spacecraft have a 3-
axis attitude control (coarse control for TARGET and more accurate for MAIN), but one of them (the TARGET) has no 
propulsion subsystem (the MAIN has a full 3-axis ∆V capability through 6 hydrazine 1N-thrusters).  
The mission’s aim is to validate some sensors and actuators and especially formation flying technologies and 
algorithms.  

Figure 1: MAIN (left) and TARGET (right) PRISMA spacecraft (SSC) 

PRISMA includes cooperations with other agencies about specific technologies validations: 
• An experiment led by DLR will be based on RGPS; it will be the main relative navigation system on PRISMA; 
• An experiment led by DTU will be based on VBS (this uses a technology derived from a star tracker in order 
to track the TARGET and provide relative navigation); 
• An experiment (named FFIORD) led by CNES will be based on FFRF (developed by Thales Alenia Space 
under CNES and CDTI co-funding) as relative navigation sensor. 
4. THE FFIORD EXPERIMENT 
The FFIORD experiment (refer to [2] and [3] for further details) aims at flight validating an FFRF sensor derived from 
a GPS receiver and designed for formation control, and assessing its performances, in preparation to future formation 
flying missions such as Simbol X (a French/Italian/German X-ray telescope mission): this FFRF will be used as coarse 
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relative navigation metrology for CNES and ESA formation flying missions. FFIORD aims as well at validating various 
typical autonomous rendezvous and formation guidance and control algorithms (based on relative navigation provided 
by FFRF).  
The FFRF is made of a terminal and a set of Rx or Rx/Tx antennas on each spacecraft; Tx antennas generate a GPS-like 
signal (a code modulated on L1 and L2 frequencies), so that the system provides a navigation filter with range, radial 
velocity and line of sight measurements. It operates within a typical range of 3 m – 30 km. 

Figure 2: Two-satellite FFRF configuration 

The FFIORD experiment will be made of two phases. During a first phase, FFIORD will be a secondary experiment on-
board: while the MAIN is operated within a large range of relative distance, velocity and configuration, the FFRF 
sensor will provide the CNES GNC function with measurements, and the CNES navigation function will process them 
off-line. In this phase all functions work in open loop, allowing pre-validation of the navigation function itself.   
In a second phase, FFIORD becomes a primary experiment, which means the CNES GNC function takes control of the 
spacecraft. It is 27 days long, with a propellant budget of 5 m/s. A first sub-phase (10 days) is dedicated to a deeper 
validation of the FFRF and the navigation function, through dedicated trajectory and attitude profiles to test the whole 
position/dynamics working range (the reference being GPS data from the DLR’s receiver to assess the navigation 
performance). The 17 remaining days are dedicated to formation flying experiments: the spacecraft’s GNC is ensured 
by the CNES GNC function in closed loop, and several functions necessary to standard formation flying that are hosted 
by the CNES GNC function can be tested (there is first a commissioning phase for all functions, then several scenarios 
test guidance functions in various configurations): 
• Proximity operations: relative station keeping in the vicinity of the TARGET and forced low-speed translations 
(in-plane and out-of-plane); 
• Rendezvous (refer to [5]): the objective is to perform semi-autonomous rendezvous from about 10 km (i.e. the 
initial manoeuvres plan is designed by the ground, but is tuned on-board according to the current trajectory); 
• A 2-manoeuvre transfer guidance function: it is a simple and robust function that sets the MAIN onto a 
predefined orbit (for example in case of anomaly); 
• A stand-by function: it controls the MAIN on a safe stable relative orbit with a low consumption (typically 
after a failure is detected); 
• A collision avoidance function (detailed below). 
The CNES GNC mode of the on-board software implements the RF sensor-based relative navigation and guidance 
functions, including proximity operations (close station keeping and translations), stand-by, rendezvous and collision 
avoidance. 
The on-board software is implemented as a Matlab/Simulink® library delivered to SSC and then autocoded into C code 
with the Real Time Workshop Embedded coder® (the use of autocoded software is another experiment part of PRISMA 
demonstration). 
5. THE FFIORD EXPERIMENT’S ANTICOLLISION FUNCTION 
The design, implementation and validation of the FFIORD’s anticollision function are subject to a partnership between 
EADS ASTRIUM and CNES. Design and implementation were carried out in the second semester of 2006, and then the 
partnership was extended in 2007 for performance validation. 
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GNC software developed by SSC also includes an anticollision function, but FFIORD’s software has its own function 
as it is a basic safety function that would be part of any formation flying mission. As one of CNES’ aims in its 
participation to PRISMA is to get experience about all GNC issues related to formation flying, the need for such a 
function was obvious.  
This function is intended to detect any risk of collision between MAIN and TARGET spacecraft, according to a given 
criterion, and then to compute and command manoeuvres to the MAIN so that relative configuration remains safe and 
any collision risk is avoided as long as ground has not taken over. The function’s design was driven by the following 
constraints: 
• Only the MAIN has a propulsion system; 
• As it is a basic safety function, it should be autonomous (no intervention from ground, which would not be 
possible on time), simple and robust, and cannot fail in computing and then performing the required 
manoeuvres (simple computations, and limited number of manoeuvres); 
• SSC put strict constraints on CPU requirements: 10 ms every second only from the LEON3 on-board processor 
are allocated to FFIORD; given that many other functions, necessarily complex, are implemented within 
FFIORD’s software, this emphasizes again the need for a simple function, with few computations; 
• At time when the anticollision function was designed, simulation tools were very limited; this implied to 
design something that remained as open as possible: typically several implemented options, so that if after 
performance tests one of these options appeared not to be reliable enough there were other options left. 
This function is not in charge of managing all safety issues and anomalies (e.g. relative navigation not reliable, loss of 
the intersatellite link or relative navigation, ∆V magnitude exceeding a threshold, etc.). Beside this function, two other 
can be triggered to manage anomalies distinct from a too small intersatellite distance: a 2-manoeuvre transfer function 
can set the MAIN onto a predefined safe orbit (for instance in case of a problem occurring during a rendezvous), and a 
stand-by function autonomously maintains the MAIN on a safe stable orbit. 
5.1. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
A safety sphere is defined around the TARGET spacecraft, and a collision risk is detected if the MAIN spacecraft enters 
this safety sphere; this detection is based on relative navigation data (position is assumed known within navigation 
errors and reliable) thanks to the FFRF sensor. If a collision risk is detected, collision avoidance algorithms shall 
compute a manoeuvre that immediately sets the MAIN spacecraft onto a relative orbit that remains outside the defined 
safety sphere, for a long enough period so that ground can take over. 
Given model errors, navigation errors and manoeuvre realization errors, it is likely that although the MAIN spacecraft is 
set onto a safe relative trajectory, this relative trajectory can be partially and marginally inside the safety sphere. In such 
a case another manoeuvre would be commanded, though not necessary, whenever the MAIN goes through the safety 
sphere after the first detection. That’s why a second safety sphere is defined, with a smaller radius (smaller enough so 
that it accounts for all errors mentioned above, with respect to the first sphere). After the first threshold is reached, 
collision risks detection is based upon the second threshold, up to a reset sent by ground. The second threshold 
represents the limit that should not be reached under any circumstances. If nevertheless it were reached, a new 
manoeuvre would be computed and commanded, and then anticollision would be disabled (up to a reset sent by 
ground): indeed repeated manoeuvres must be avoided, as it may mean there is a failure (for example in manoeuvre 
realization or navigation), and lead to exhaust propellant. Once ground has got the collision risk detection by board, 
taken over, sent the relevant commands and brought the MAIN back to a standard configuration, it can reset the 
anticollision function. 
The choice of the safety threshold should of course remain compliant with mission’s objectives (requirements on 
achievable relative distance), but for anticollision robustness, it must also comply with expectable relative dynamics 
after the collision avoidance manoeuvre (in particular threshold should be such that all possible errors cannot cancel 
relative distance). The design must also consider the ground reaction delay (in particular for this kind of orbit, and with 
a single ground station, the number of daily visibilities is limited): safety has to be guaranteed as long as ground has not 
taken over. 
5.2. MODEL OF MOTION 
The main spacecraft’s motion is described in a referential linked to the target spacecraft; the related frame is the local 
orbital frame ( )zyxO  ,,,  described by: 
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• O is the target spacecraft’s centre of mass; 
• zyx 

∧=  (tangential direction if orbit is circular); 
• y
 is opposite to angular momentum; 
• z

 nadir. 









Figure 3: Local orbital frame definition 
The target spacecraft’s orbit is assumed quasi-circular (PRISMA orbit is actually expected to have an eccentricity less 
than 0.004), and the distance between both spacecraft is assumed negligible with respect to the Earth-spacecraft 
distance. Under these assumptions, Hill’s equations apply with a reasonable accuracy1 and describe the main 
spacecraft’s relative motion with respect to the target; they are given by: 
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One of the advantages of applying Hill’s equations is that it is compliant with the requirement of simplicity and 
robustness. 
Without any perturbing acceleration, relative motion has the following characteristics: 
• the along y-axis motion is a simple oscillation at orbital period; 
• if the condition 00 2 zx ω= [Eq. 2] is checked, then the relative orbit does not drift (both orbits have the same 
semi-major axis); its projection onto the (xz) plane is an ellipse (that can collapse to a single point) whose 
major axis is aligned with the x axis and is twice as long as its minor axis; the projection onto the (yz) plane is 
an ellipse (that can collapse to a segment) whose size and orientation depend on inclination and eccentricity 
separation vectors; this relative orbit is therefore stable and periodic (if there is no perturbation, of course). 
5.3. MANOEUVRE COMPUTATION 
In accordance with what was explained about driving constraints, several options are considered and implemented for 
the relative trajectory after a collision risk is detected. All of them are based on Hill’s equations, with no perturbations, 
and not considering any error such as navigation or manoeuvre realization. 
5.3.1. FIRST OPTION: RELATIVE DRIFT ORBIT 
A first option that can be considered consists in setting a relative drift between TARGET and MAIN (distinct semi-
major axes). This option appears to be very simple and very safe (as relative distance tends to continuously increase on 
mid-term), provided relative drift is carefully selected: indeed the relative trajectory projected in the (xz) plane can 
make some loops, especially if drift is small, so that TARGET could get back just after the manoeuvre or after one 
revolution. 
What is proposed is creating a V∆  opposite to current velocity (at the time when a collision risk is detected) in the (yz) 
plane, so that current velocity is cancelled, and setting a proper drift: 
• Cancelling velocity along y: 00 =y ; [Eq. 3.1] 
• Cancelling velocity along z: 00 =z ; [Eq. 3.2] 
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• ( )000 sgn2 xkzx ⋅+= ω  where k is a parameter (strictly positive) selected by TC (sgn(x0)2 gives the right 
orientation outwards the sphere to the trajectory just after the manoeuvre). [Eq. 3.3] 
If the value of k is too small, either the initial velocity is such that the trajectory does not immediately exit the sphere, or 
the trajectory crosses again the sphere one revolution later, due to a weak drift. Taking into account no errors at this 
stage, and denoting TARGET’s pulsation ω and the safety threshold d, it appears the minimal intersatellite distance 
(after the manoeuvre) is 0.946d for k=ωd (because the very start of the trajectory is inwards in some cases); for 
k=1.2ωd, it is 0.977d; for k=1.3ωd, it is 0.986; beyond k=1.7ωd, it is d. A value of 1.2ωd a priori seems enough, but 
this has to be confirmed by performance tests with a more realistic orbital dynamics. 
Even though this option seems safe, one drawback can be expected: if ground does not take over soon enough, then the 
relative distance can become rather high, which means either a long delay or a high propellant cost for a new 
rendezvous and the mission resumption. That’s why a second option can be considered, which consists in a relative 
stable orbit: in such a case, recovery would be quicker (typically one orbital period). 
5.3.2. SECOND OPTION: RELATIVE STABLE ORBIT 
This option consists in finding a manoeuvre that would set the MAIN onto a relative stable (periodic) orbit (same semi-
major axes) that remains outside the safety sphere (taking into account neither perturbations nor errors). As this relative 
orbit is periodic, it remains in the vicinity of the TARGET (given that orbital period is much smaller than ground’s 
reaction delay). There are two special cases with a straightforward manoeuvre that comply with this requirement: 
• If the MAIN crosses the safety sphere in the (yz) plane on the point (x0, y0, z0) then the condition 00 2 zx ω=  
ensures stability (no drift  projection onto (xz) is an ellipse), and conditions 00 zy ω=  and 00 yz ω−=  (or 
00 zy ω−=  and 00 yz ω= ) yield a relative motion whose projection onto (yz) is a circle that has the same radius 
as the safety sphere;  [Eq. 4.1] 
• If the MAIN crosses the safety sphere in the (xz) plane on the point (x0, y0, z0) then the condition 00 2 zx ω=  
ensures stability, and the condition 00 2 xz ω−= yields a relative motion whose projection onto (xz) is an ellipse 
tangent to the sphere at the impact point and that remains outside it.  [Eq. 4.2] 

Figure 4: Two examples for an initial point in the (xz) plane (d is the safety sphere’s radius) 
A combination of these two case yields a generalization: conditions ( ) ( ) 0000 sgnsgn zxyy ω⋅⋅=  and 
( ) 202000 4sgn yxxz +⋅⋅−= ω (the sign of 0z  should be defined by x0 so that the ellipse in the (xz) plane systematically 
remains around TARGET, then it defines the sign of 0y ) yields an ellipse and intersatellite distance remains greater than 
  
2
 sgn(x)=+1 if x0 and -1 if x<0. 
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0.975d (with d the safety threshold). These conditions do not give a minimal relative distance greater than d strictly, 
nevertheless 0.975d is acceptable.  [Eq. 4.3] 
This manoeuvre is simple to compute and is interesting because MAIN remains in TARGET’s vicinity, nevertheless it 
has a potential flaw that can probably be expected before any performance assessment: if the impact point is in (xz) 
plane (and especially close to x-axis), safety relies on tangential separation, which is probably not so reliable (mainly 
owing to differential drag, significant at this altitude and this epoch, but also to eccentricity, which is neglected in Hill’s 
equations). That’s why a third option was designed, in case this one would have proved not robust enough. 
5.3.3. THIRD OPTION: 2-∆V RELATIVE STABLE ORBIT 
This option is inspired by geostationary spacecraft collocation. It assumes tangential separation is not reliable (because 
any tiny error, due to navigation, manoeuvre realization or model simplification, may result in a wrong semi-major axis, 
and thus a wrong mean motion, which may cancel tangential separation); therefore radial and normal separations (i.e. 
eccentricity and inclination separations3) are phased so that when one of them cancels, the other is maximal. Typically 
this can be achieved in this case if after ∆V commanded by anticollision, the relative trajectory projected onto (yz) 
plane (the normal-radial plane) is a circle (whose radius is the safety threshold). 
Such a trajectory cannot be reached with a single ∆V, unless the initial point on safety sphere (x0, y0, z0) is already in 
(yz) plane. In other cases, 2 ∆V are necessary. There is not a single solution, but what is proposed is that the first ∆V is 
identical to that of the previous option, so that the configuration is as safe as possible if the second manoeuvre cannot be 
performed for any reason. Based on Hill’s equations (and thus not taking into account any error or perturbation), one 
can demonstrate that there is always a solution: if the time when a collision risk is detected is assumed equal to 0, and if 
the ∆V computed according to [Eq. 4.3] is applied at this time, then the projection of the subsequent relative trajectory 
onto (yz) crosses the circle of radius d (d is still the safety threshold) and centred on TARGET every t such as: 
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This yields 4 times every revolution; at the soonest time for instance, one of the following conditions (the condition 
leading to the smallest ∆V can be chosen) applied to relative velocity through a second manoeuvre gives the desired 
trajectory: 
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 is the relative position at the time of the second manoeuvre (it can be 
derived from current position/velocity thanks to Hill’s equations).  [Eq. 5.2] 
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Figure 5: An example of option 3 implementation (at initial time, a collision risk is detected, with a threshold of 
20 m, a first ∆V is immediately applied, and then a second one); propagation over 2 revolutions based on Hill’s 
equations 
Leftwards: relative trajectory projected onto (xz) (green), (yz) (red) and (xy) (blue) 
Rightwards: relative distance (m) versus time (s) 
5.4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTICOLLISION FUNCTION 
This function is implemented as a Matlab/Simulink library, which is then integrated into the FFIORD library; this 
library is autocoded into C code with the Real Time Workshop Embedded coder® in order to generate the on-board 
software. The function will be activated by the on-board software at 1 Hz. 
The anticollision library with its interface is plotted below: 
 
Figure 6: Anticollision library 
Its inputs are described below: 
• A TC to set anticollision parameters (mainly definition of the two safety thresholds, and the kind of 
anticollision algorithm chosen for each of them); 
• A TC to reset anticollision after a collision risk has been detected; 
• A TC for some additional parameters common with the rendezvous function (orbital pulsation) 
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• Relative navigation data and on-board time. 
Its outputs are given below: 
• A TM flow output every second, with a flag for each threshold and, if relevant, computed ∆V; 
• The commanded ∆V in local orbital frame and its time (0 as long as no collision risk detected); 
• A specific flag towards FFIORD software to disable its other functions (e.g. rendezvous) when a collision risk 
is detected. 
6. ANTICOLLISION FUNCTION SIMULATION AND ASSESSMENT 
The function’s performance (i.e. its ability to set the MAIN onto an orbit that remains outside the safety sphere once a 
collision risk is detected) is driven by the following errors and simplifications operated in algorithms:  
• A first model error is due to the use of Hill’s equations in the computation of manoeuvres; in particular the 
TARGET orbit is not perfectly circular (an eccentricity up to 0.004 is expected); this means in particular that 
the stability condition from Hill’s equations [Eq. 2] is slightly erroneous (see footnote in section  6.2); 
• A second model error, also related with the selection of Hill’s equations, is due to dynamics: Hill’s equations 
actually assume a Keplerian motion; therefore perturbations such as geopotential’s higher orders, drag, luni-
solar attraction and Sun radiation pressure are not taken into account; drag in particular is expected to bring a 
significant limitation to performances (PRISMA should be launched not earlier than 2009, thus with a rather 
high Sun activity); 
• Navigation errors: this brings an error on collision risk detection (wrong intersatellite distance computation) 
and on ∆V computation (it depends on  current position and velocity); 
• Manoeuvre realization errors (MIB, and so on). 
Besides, performance can be expected to depend on the impact point’s location on the safety sphere (because of 
algorithms on the one hand and because of navigation performance, which depend on relative configuration, on the 
other hand): even though the MAIN is not expected to be out a cone around tangential axis, statistical simulations 
should account for this in order to cover all possible relative configurations. 
In order to assess accurately performances, as well as performances of other FFIORD functions, an accurate simulator 
was developed by CNES under Matlab/Simulink. It models in particular all the errors listed above and enables Monte-
Carlo simulations by a statistical model of relevant parameters. All the following results rely on simulation of at least 
1000 cases. 
The safety threshold considered in these simulations is 20 m as it will be the typical minimal relative distance during 
FFIORD experiment. The expectation is that with such a threshold, relative distance remains high enough for safety 
(typically at least 5 m whatever errors over one day), otherwise this would imply a higher threshold, so that the whole 
relative distance range cannot be tested for FFRF validation. 
6.1. ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 1 
The expected robustness of this option was confirmed by simulations. In any case and whatever errors, the minimal 
intersatellite distance is greater than 19.5 m (for a safety threshold of 20 m), which is in accordance with what was 
expected. Of course for this option, the maximal intersatellite distance is also a major criterion, as recovery after it is 
triggered is either longer or more expensive (in term of propellant) if this intersatellite distance is greater. 
Hill’s equations show relative distance should be about 6.6 km after one day (for a safety threshold of 20 m), with no 
perturbations or errors. This means a new rendezvous would be necessary after this option is triggered. Perturbations 
and errors can bring about 1 km more or less (for a very high solar activity), mainly due to differential drag. 
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Figure 7: Number of cases (out of 1000) vs. maximal relative distance (m) after 1 day 
Maximal distances are separated into two bins, depending on the initial point’s position with respect to radial axis 
6.2. ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 2 
This option quickly proved its lack of robustness and is not reliable enough to be operationally implemented. Indeed in 
some configurations, the non-cancellation of the minimal relative distance (or even the fact the MAIN remains far 
enough from the TARGET) cannot be guaranteed over a long enough period: 
• The fact eccentricity is neglected in Hill’s equations leads to a wrong stability condition [Eq. 2]4, so that if the 
impact point on the safety sphere is close to the orbital plane, tangential separation (which safety relies on, in 
such a configuration) can decrease significantly for some TARGET’s true anomalies: typically up to 5-7 m lost 
(with no other errors modelled) over only 3 revolutions in 0.75% of cases (initial minimal distance is 20 m); 
one can infer from these results that after one day minimal relative distance would have lost at least 10 m in 
about 6% of cases; 
• Again when the impact point on the safety sphere is close to orbital plane, manoeuvre realization errors can 
lead to very small minimal relative distances: for example, it is less than 10 m after 4 revolutions in about 5% 
of cases (the manoeuvre realization error’s standard deviation can go up to 10%); 
• Drag has a major impact, as it could be expected, again especially when the impact point is in orbital plane; 
simulations over 1 day show a minimal relative distance less than 10 m in typically 7-10 % of cases depending 
on Sun activity (even with medium activities); it can reach only 3-4 m in worst cases, and this minimum can be 
reached within a few revolutions 
These partial results clearly show this option is not compatible with FFIORD mission requirements: it would be 
necessary to take margins on the safety threshold such that mission’s experimental objectives could not be completely 
reached. 
6.3. ASSESSMENT OF OPTION 3 
Simulations based on a safety threshold of 20 m, show the following facts: 
  
4
 According to [4], tangential velocity error can be bounded by: 000 32 zezx ωω ≤−  [Eq. 7], which yields about 2 m per revolution (worst case) 
here: this is consistent with what expected. In order to handle this issue, target’s eccentricity should be taken into account in equations (for example 
using Lawden’s equations instead of Hill’s equations, given they are much more complex). 
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• Eccentricity has a small impact: minimal relative distance greater than 18.8 m, stable from a revolution to 
another (it is just a small distortion of the desired trajectory in the radial-normal plane); this option clearly 
improves results with respect to option 2 on this issue; 
• Navigation errors have an acceptable impact: minimal relative distance greater than 17 m, stable too; 
• Propulsion errors also have an acceptable impact: minimal relative distance greater than 16.5 m in most cases 
(and up to 14.7 m in 1% of cases, given that very conservative hypotheses are assumed), and the most 
important, this remains stable (it is also just a slight distortion of the desired trajectory in the radial-normal 
plane); 
• Differential drag (and solar radiation pressure) has a stronger impact: minimal relative distance greater than 
13.5 m over one day whatever solar activity. 
The option’s performance regarding orbital perturbations is explained by the fact that radial separation is eroded by 
differential drag (and therefore is not as reliable as normal separation). Performance is not actually better with a 
medium solar activity (F10.7 cm=150.10-22 W.m-2.Hz-1) than with a very high activity (F10.7=350): the minimum is reached 
after about 10-15 revolutions (almost one day) in the former case, and much sooner (a couple of revolutions) in the 
latter case. The radial separation evolution can be rather complex because of attitude control (as FFRF antennas must 
remain pointed towards each other in order to keep a good navigation performance, any normal separation leads to an 
attitude control that induces large variations of the ballistic coefficient). The next plots illustrate such a case: attitude 
control first induces a large difference on differential drag, which induces a quick and important variation of radial 
separation; the MAIN moves away along tangential axis, so that normal separation becomes less dominant; this yields 
an inversion of differential drag that inverts the evolution of radial separation, so that tangential separation vanishes 
(and normal separation gets dominant again, thus a new inversion of differential drag). 

Differential drag (MAIN-TARGET) in m.s-2 
vs. time (s) [blue along x] over 3 revolutions 

Tangential separation (m) vs. time (s) over 3 
revolutions 

Radial separation (m) vs. time (s) over 3 
revolutions 
Figure 8: The differential drag effect with option 3 
Nevertheless the overall performance of this option remains acceptable. The following plots show performances with all 
sources of errors taken into account. Very conservative hypotheses are considered for manoeuvre realization errors 
(standard deviation up to 10%), drag (Solar activity set to F10.7=350) and eccentricity (e=0.005): 
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Figure 9: Option 3 performance 
This shows that minimal relative distance remains greater than 5 m over almost one day and a half, given it is more than 
10 m in 95% of cases.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Accurate simulations show that the single-∆V drift orbit option is very robust and reliable, and ensures collision 
avoidance even with a high level of errors. On the other hand, it leads the MAIN spacecraft rather long away from the 
TARGET, especially if ground does not take over quickly (typically up to 8 km after one day). The single-∆V stable 
periodic relative orbit (which avoids this drawback), on its side, appeared not to be reliable enough (unless taking 
penalizing margins on the safety threshold), so that it would probably not be used. The double-∆V stable periodic 
relative orbit option, based on a phasing of inclination and eccentricity separations, and thus of radial and normal 
separations, shows a medium robustness: it is definitely more robust than the single-∆V strategy, but radial separation is 
not so reliable on mid-term, mainly owing to the effect of differential drag: while tangential separation is not 
controllable, radial separation, initially set to 20 m, can be reduced of about 6 m. 
Given that the FFIORD anticollision function implements two distinct safety thresholds, with a collision avoidance 
manoeuvre computed for each of them, a possibility consists in setting the first threshold to about 20 m (compatible 
with mission’s objectives) with the double-∆V stable periodic relative orbit option, which avoids to move the MAIN 
away; then the second threshold is set to a much smaller value, but selecting the drift orbit option in order to ensure 
safety as a last resort, in case the first collision avoidance double manoeuvre was not robust enough (and as this second 
threshold is smaller, the maximal intersatellite distance induced by drift is reduced accordingly). 
Eventually, this shows it would be interesting to implement and analyze an alternative option which would consist in 
performing a first manoeuvre to create a proper drift, and then a second one to stabilize the MAIN on an orbit with 
characteristics to be determined: this would combine the robustness of the drift orbit option while avoiding to get the 
MAIN too far away from the TARGET. 
8. REFERENCES 
[1] PRISMA: an autonomous formation flying mission 
 S. Persson et al. – Small satellites systems and services symposium – 25th - 29th September 2006, Chia Laguna, 
Italy 
[2] RF metrology validation and formation flying demonstration by small satellites: the CNES participation on the 
PRISMA mission 
 J. Harr, M. Delpech et al. – Small satellites systems and services symposium – 25th - 29th September 2006, 
Chia Laguna, Italy 
14/14 
[3] CNES formation flying experiment on PRISMA mission 
 M. Delpech et al. – 30th annual AAS guidance and control conference – 3rd-7th February 2007, Breckenridge, 
Colorado 
[4] Spacecraft relative orbit geometry description through orbit element differences 
 H. Schaub – 14th US national congress of theoretical and applied mechanics – 23rd-28th June 2002, 
Blacksburg,, VA  
[5] CNES approaching guidance experiment within FFIORD 
 J. –C. Berges et al. – 20th ISSFD – 24th-28th September 2007, Annapolis, Maryland 
 
